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EMIL PALERMO, Respondent, v. STOCKTON THEATRES, 
INC., Appellant. 
[1] Statutes- Legislation by Reference or Adoption. - Where a 
statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another 
statut.e, regullltion or ordinance, such provisions are incorpo-
rated in the form in which they exist at the time of the refer-
ence and not as subsequently modified, and the repeal of the 
pro'risions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in 
t.he absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary. 
[2] ld.-Legislation by Reference or Adoption.-The rule as to 
statutory adoption by specific reference to the provisions of 
another statute applics to the adoption of statutes of another 
jurisdiction and treaties. 
[3] ld.-Legislation by Reference or Adoption.-Where a stat-
ute adopts by reference 0. system or body of laws or the 
general law relating to the subject in hand, the statute takes 
the law or laws referred to, not only in their contemporary 
form, but also as they mey be changed from time to time, and 
as they may be subjected to elimination by repeal. 
[4] Alienage-Alien Land Law-Construction of Statute.-A pro-
vision in the Alien Land Law (Stats. 1921, p. lxxxiii, as 
amended; 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 261) that aliens not 
eligible to citizenship may occupy and use realty in the state 
t.o the extent and for the purposes prescribed by "any treaty 
now existing between the government of the United States 
and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or 
subject," refers to a specific treaty, and hence the abrogation 
in 1940 of the treaty between the United States and Japan 
did not affect the validity of the Alien Land Law, and a lease 
of business property to a corporation, the capital stock of 
which was principlllly owned.by nationals of Japan, was valid. 
15] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construc-
tion in Favor of Constitutionality.-Where a statute is reasoD-
[1] See 23 Ca1.Jur. 685; 50 Am.Jur. 57. 
[2] Sec 52 Am.Jur. SOi, 815. 
[5] S<'(' 5 Cal.Jur. (j];j; ]] Am.Jur. 729. 
_ McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Statutes, §79; [4] Alienage, § 40; 
!;ij Const.itutional Law, §48; [6,7,9,11] Alienage, §S6; (8] 
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ably susceptible of two constructions, that construction which 
will uphold the statute is to be preferr('d to a construction 
of doubtful validity. 
[6] AlieJ:.ago-Alien Land Law-Validity.-Thc Alien Land Law 
refers to treatics with the nations eom'('rned only as sueh 
treaties existed Ilt the time of the passage of the act, dednres 
the law of the Btnte :lDd not the provisions of tht: trent)' agree-
ments between the United States and other nations, and is un-
afi'ectt:d, insofnr as it mny remain valid as a law of the state, 
by abrogation or amendment of a treaty, and hence the act 
docs not unconstitutionally delegate to the treaty-making au-
thority of the United States the power to terminate or change 
the aet. 
{7] Id.-Alien Land Law-Nature of Legislation.-The Alien Land 
Law is not tcmpornry or emergency h:gislation the operntive 
effect of which, by reason of changed conditions, must be 
deemed to hnve terminated of its own limitations, or which 
should be declared obsolete becnuse to enforce it would be in-
equitable. 
[8] Treaties-Duration.-The commercial treaty of April 5, 1911, 
between {Tnited States and Jnpnn providing that the treaty 
"shall enter into operation on the 17th of July, 1911 and <loall 
remain in forcc twelve years or until the expiration of six 
montbs from the date on which either of the Contracting Par-
ties shall have given notice to the other of its intention to 
terminate," considered as municipal law, must be de(,Dled to 
have heen permanent or perpetual. 
[9] Alienage - Alien Land Law - ValiditY.-The silence of the 
Legislature in the 1943 and 1945 amendmE'nts to the Alien Land 
Law on the question of the effect of the abrogation of the 
treaty with Japan seems to indicate its opinion that the abro-
gation had DO effect on the provisions of the act. 
[10] Landlord and Tenant-Leases-Options to Purchase.-A lease 
of business property to a corporation, the capital stock of which 
was owned principally by nationals of Japan, was not invalid, 
assuming that a provision giving the· corporation an option to 
purchase the land was void insofar as it purported to confer 
such right on a noneligible alien, since such provision was sev-
erable from other provisions of the lease and could not affect 
the remaining and valid portions thereof. 
[11] Alienage-Alien Land Law-ValiditY.-The Alien Land Act 
is not unconstitutional as infringing on the treaty-making 
power of the federal government. 
[12] Constitutional Law - Constitutionality of Statutes - Avoid-
Ance of Unnecessary Decisions.-A court will not decidc a con-
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stitutional question whrre other grounds arc available and 
disposit.ive of fbI' il'll'lnl'5 of thl' ~nl'll'. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Joaquin County. M.. G. Woodward .• fudge. Reversed. 
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment for plaintiff 
reversed. 
Freed & Freed, Eli Freed, EmmettF. Gebauer, William F. 
Cleary and Guy C. Cal den for Appellant. 
Honey & Mayall, }4'orrest E. Macomber, A. B. Bianchi and 
Garrett H. Elmore for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J .-In a suit for declaratory relief plaintiff 
seeks to have adjudged violative of the California Alien Land 
Act (Stats. 1921, p. lxuili, as amended; 1 Deering's Gen. 
Laws, Act 261), and consequently void and of no effect, a 
lease of commercial real property in California executed by 
plaintiff's predecessor in int~rest, as lessor, to defendant cor-
poration, as lessee. The defendant le&;ee corporation also is 
the successor in interest of the lessees' rights, if any there be, 
under a previously executed l('ase of the same property to cer-
tain Japanese nationals. The capital stock of defendant lessee 
is and at all times concerned has been •• principally and almost 
wholly" owned by nationals of Japan; i. e., by aliens not eligi-
ble to citizenship in this country. 
Under the prm'isions of the Alien Land Act (§ 3), as 
amended in 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 1021), the right to Jease, or 
otherwise use or enjoy, real property in this state is granted 
to such a corporation •• to the extent and for the purposes 
prescribed by any treaty now existing between the . . . enited 
States" and Japan. The trial court rendered judgment in 
plaintiff-lessor's favor, declaring that the lease "is, and at all 
times was, void," and defendant-lessee appealed. Following 
decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third Appellate Dis-
trict, reversing the judgment, this court granted a hearing 
for the purpose of giving further study to the problems pre-
sented and to consider in particular the question of a possible 
infringement by the state statute upon the treaty powers of 
the federal government. After such study we haye concluded 
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by Mr. Justice Peek, correctly treats ana disposes of all issul':) 
essentially involved, and it is therefore, with further discus· 
sion concerning the asserted conflict between state statut~ 
and federal treaty power, and comment as to a su~gested con· 
stitutional pronouncement, adopted as the opinion of this 
court. Such opinion (with appropriate deletions and additions 
of introductory, conjunctive, and other pro forma matter as 
indicated) is as follows: 
., [ ] The record [ ] discloses [ ] the following [undis-
puted] facts: 
"On January 3,1930, respondent's [plaintiff lessor's] prede-
cessor leased to appellant's [defendant lessee's] predecessors, 
who were nationals of Japan, certain premises situated in the 
city of Stockton, California, for theater purposes for a term 
of 10 years, commencing January 1, 1931, under the provisions 
of the Alien Land Act of this state (Stats. 1921, p. lxxxiii, as 
amended; 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 261), and in accordance 
with the provisions of the commercial treaty which had been 
concluded between the United States and Japan on April 5, 
1911 (37 Stats. at L. 1504). On December 22,1934, respond-
ent's predecessor gave the lessees an option for a term of 10 
years longer than the term of the original lease. Said option 
recited that it was given for a valuable consideration, and that 
it was attached to and became a part of the coudition of said 
lease. On January 16, 1935, the lessees, with the consent of 
the lessor, transferred all their right, title and interest in said 
lease and option to the appellant, a corporation, the capital 
stock of which was almost wholly owned by nationals of Japan. 
On January 26, 1940, the treaty between the United States 
and Japan was abrogated. On February 14, 1940, appellant 
served respondent's predecessor with a written notice of its 
election to exercise said option for an additional term of 10 
years, commencing January 1, 1941, and on September 13, 
1940, pursuant to said option the parties entered into a written 
agreement of lease for the additional term of 10 years. On 
October 27, 1941, respondent's predecessor died, and rcspond-
ent became the legal owner of the premi~ws in question. 
"The record further discloses that on October 19, 1944. 
respondent, who had been employed by appellant in the opera-
tion of the theater from 1936 to the time the present action 
was filed, served on appellant a demand that the latter vacate 
the premis('s forthwith, on th£' ground that thp occupancy 
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AIi<>n Land Act of California. On November 20, 1944, the 
pr(>F;t:'llt action waF; brought by respondent to have the rights 
IIf tht:' pllrtil,x ndjudjl'atrd. 
"TIl(' tt·jal court found gencrally in favor of respondent, 
:l1Id particlllarly t.hat the leasl:' of Scptember 13, 1940, was 
'pnrtinll.v It new Lease and partially an ntcllsion of the pre-
existing Lt'usc,' that no notice of appellant 'selection to exer-
cise the option was served on respondent's predecessor until 
P~brllary 14, 1940,. which \Vat; subsequent to the termination 
of the treaty between the United States and Japan, and that, 
\v.ltilc there was no proof of a conspiracy to violate the law, 
tht' said lease was void and of no force or effect whatsoever. 
In n written memorandum of decision the trial court predi-
cated its holding on the ground that the treaty removed the 
lease from the operation of the California statute and that in 
the absence of a treaty, a japanese alien cannot enter into a 
lease of commercial property in the State of California. 
"While other issues were raised in the proceedings in the 
trial court and are argued in the briefs on appeal, the basic 
qu('stion on which the correctness of the judgment herein 
turns is the effect of the abrogation of the treaty between the 
United States and Japan on the permissive provisions of the 
.Alien Land Act with respect to the right of a corporation in 
which a majority of the issued capital stock is owned by non-
eligible aliens of Japanese nationality to acquire or enjoy an 
interest in real property in tbis state which could have been 
acquired or enjoyed under the terms of said treaty. 
, 'The pertinent provisions of the act in question, sections 
1, 2 and 3 of the Alien Land Law (1 Deering's Gen. Laws, 
Act 261), as adopted by the electorate of this state in 1920. 
nnd thereaft.er [pursuant to permission contained in § 13 of 
th(' initiative act] amended by t.he act of the Legislature ap-
proved ,June 20, 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 1021), and as they read 
at the time hE'rein involvcd, provided as follows: 
.. 'I. An aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of 
thp United States mny acquire, possellS, enjoy, use, cultivate, 
occupy, transfer, transmit and inherit real property, or any 
lnh'rE'st therein, in this state, and have in whole or in part 
tilC bcn<.>ficial use thereof, in the same manner and to the same 
f'xtE'nf. as citizens of the United States, except as otherwise 
pro\'idpd by the laws of thiR 8tnt<.> . 
.. '2. All aliens other tltan tllo1'\(> mentioned in section one 
of thix aet may acquire, PO!'l.'I(,RS, rnjoy, use, cultivate, occupy 
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and tran;.;f(·r rcal property, or any interest th~rein. JIJ t ltill 
Idati', and ha\'(' in whole or in part th~ beneficial Use tll\'l"I·"f. 
in the l1lann!!!" and to the extent, and for the purpose~ prE.'-
seribed by any treat.y now existing bet weeD the government of 
the United States and the nation or country of which such 
alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise. 
" '3. Any company, association or corporation organized 
under the laws of this or any other state or union, of which a 
majority of the members are aliens other than those specified 
in section oue of this act, or in which a majority of the issued 
capital stock is owned b~' such aliens, may acquire, possess, 
enjoy, lise, cultivate. ol'eupy aud transfer real property, or any 
interest therein, in this state, aud have in whole or in part 
the beneficial use thereof, in the manner and to the extent aud 
for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing be-
t,ween the government of the United States and tIle nation or 
country of which such members or stockholders are citizen!! 
or subjects, and not otherwise. Hereafter all aliens other than 
those specified in section one hereof may become members of 
or acquire shares of stock in any COmpany, as;.;ociation or cor-
poration that is or may be authorized to acquire, possess, en-
joy, use, cultivate, occupy and transfer real property, or any 
interest therein, in this state, in the manner and to the extent 
and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing 
between the government of the United States and the nation 
or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not 
otherwi;.;e. ' 
"Likc\vise the pertinent provisions of article I of the Treaty 
of April 5, 1911, between the United States and Japan pro-
\>ided in part: 
" 'The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting 
Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the 
territories of the other to carry on trade. wholesale and retail, 
to own or lease and occupy hOllses, manufactories, warehouses 
nllll shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for 
r(';.;illential and commercial purposes, and generally to do any-
thing incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms 
as nath'e citizens or subjects, submitting themseh·eg to the 
laws and regulations there established.' 
[1] "It is a wen established principle of statutory law 
that, where a statute adopts hy sp('cifi~ reference the provisions 
of another statute, rl'!!nlation. or ordinance, such provisions 
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of the refpr('n('(' anu not as snhscquC'lIt ly mod ifil'll, lind I hat 
the r('peal of tll(' provisions rcf(>rreo to d()I's not alT(~!'t the 
adoptin~ stalulC', in the abs(>nce of a e1rarly ('Xpri'ss('() inten-
tion to the eontrary. (Rancho Santa Anita v. Cily of At'cadia 
[1942],20 Cal.2u 319.322 [125 P.2d 4751 ; Bro('k v. Supcrior 
Court [19371. ~ Ca1.2d 291, 297-298 171 P.2d 209, 114 A.L.R. 
127]; In re Bllrl .. e [19231, 190 Clll. 326. :~2i-328 !212 P. 
193]; Don v. Pfister [1!H61. 172 Cal. 25.28.31 [155 P. 60]; 
Ramish v. Har'fwell [189!)], 126 Cal. 443. 447 [58 P. 920] ; 
Ventura COllnt1l v. Clay f18961, 112 Cal. 65. 72 [44 P. 488] ; 
People v. CZ.unie [1886], 70 Cal. 504, 506 [11 P. 775] ; People 
v. Whipple [1874}, 47 Cal. 592.593-594; SprinfT Volley Wafer 
W OrliS v. San Francisco [1863], 22 Cal. 434, 439; 59 C.J. 
§ 548, p. 937.) 
[2] "This principle applies to the adoption of a statute of 
another juris(liction (Brock v. Superior C01lrt. supro. at page 
297; 111 re Burke, supra, at page 328); and inasmuch as 
treaties bave the force and effect of fedl'ra) statutes (52 Am. 
Jur. §§ 4,17, pp. 807. 815), it r ] [sf'ems reasonable to hold] 
that it applies to a treaty to the same extent that it would to 
an art of Congress. 
[3] "It also [ ] [mnst] be noted that there is a cognate 
rule, recognized as applicable to many easf'S, to the effect that 
where the reference is general instead of specific, such as a 
r!'ference to a system or body of laws or to the general law 
rplating to the subject in hand, the rl'f('rrillg statute takes 
tl!e law or laws referred to not only in their contemporar~' 
form, but also as they may be changed from time to time, and 
(it may be a~sumed although no such case has come to our at· 
trntion) as they may be subjected to elimination altog-cthcr by 
repeal. (Kirk v. Rhoads f1893] , 46 Cal. 398, 403; BoTton 
v. Terra Bella Irr. Dist. [1930), 106 Cal.App. 313. 322 [28!'l 
P. 678] ; Thoits v. Byxbee [1917], 34 Cal.App. 226, 231 [167 
P. 166]; 50 Am.Jur. 58-59; 59 C.J., § 624, pp. 1060-1061. 
And see Valle.fo etc. R. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co. [1918], 177 
Cal. 249, 254 [170 P. 426].) 
[4, 5] "The question whether the reference to the treaty 
contained in the California Land Act should b{' deemed spe-
cific or genl'ral within thl' n1f'aning of tIle foregoing rules 
mig_ht, as an au-tract proposition, admit of differ<.'nt opinions. 
TIll' language is 'any treaty now l'xisting between the govern-
Input of the Ullited Rtalt',: :111(1 tll(' nation or country of whieh 
such alien is a citizell or sl,bjcct.' However, in view of the 
/ 
I 
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fact that there is grln'e doubt whet her our Legislat.ure could 
constitutionally delegate to the trE'aty-maldng authority of 
the UnitE'd States thE' ri,:rht and power thn!'; dir('ctly to con-
trol our local legislation wit h r('spE'ct to futnrE' acts (Rancho 
Santa Anita v. City of Arcadia. supra. at pagE' 319, 322: 
Brock v. Superior COllrt, supra. at page 297: In re Burke. 
supra, at pages 328-329), we are constrained to bold that the 
refE'rE'nce is specific and not general. since such a construc-
tion ill at least a reasonable one (See flnJ re Heath [1891), 
144 U.S. 92, 93-95 [12 S.Ot. 615, 36 L.Ed. 358}) and therefore 
to be preferred to one of doubtful validity (11 Am.Jur. § 97, 
pp.729-730; Alattheu:s v. Matthews f1925], 240 N.Y. 28 f147 
N.E. 237, 239. 38 A.L.R. 1079J). 
" According to the text of the former of these two last cited 
authoritiE's. 'The duty of the courts so to construe a statute 
as to save its constitutionality when it is reasonably suscep-
tible of two constrnctions includE's the duty of adopting a 
construction tbat will not subject it to a succE'ssion of doubts 
as to its constitutionality, for it is well settled that a statute 
must be construed, if fairly possiblE', so as to avoid not only 
the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubt 
upon that score.' 
"In the case last cited, the New York Court of Appeals 
said: 'A like duty requires us to avoid a constrnction which 
raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions if the 
statute can reasonably be construed so as to avoid such ques-
tions. ' 
"The conclusion which tbis construction leads to, viz., 
that the Alien Land Act incorporated the then-existing pro-
visions of the treat~· and retained them after the treaty was 
abrogated, suggests a somewhat similar situation which appar-
ently existed in some of the states whell the Volstead Act 
[41 U.S. Stats. at L., p. 305]. the provisions of which many 
local prohibition laws either adopted or copied, was repealed. 
(See, AnnotatIOn, 88 A.L.R. 1365-1369.) It seems that thl' 
general view was that the repeal did not automatically effect 
a terminatiollof the local law. In our own state the question 
was not presented, for the Wright Act {Stats. 1921, p. 79] 
was repealed [Stats. 1933, p. lxxxviii] prior to the repeal of 
the federal act; yet the decisions of our courts leave little 
doubt that had this not been dOlle the state law would have 
remaincd unaffected by the rep.'al of the national law. 
(People v. Pagni [1924], 69 Cal.App. 94, 98-99 [230 P. 1001] ; 
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/"'0/,1, \'. lrlJlJrl [19281.88 Cal.App. 621, 623 [2(;4 r. 2!l8]; 
11l rc Volpi [EI21l. 53 Cal.App. 229 [199 P. 1090]. An(l spp 
In Te Bur!.·c, supra, at pages :128-329.) 
.. Another interpstillg example of a reference statute is thp 
so-ca11('u Assilllilative Crimes Aet which embodies section 468 
(If [title 18] United States Code, and which, as enacted in 
1898 (30 Stats. 717), proyiucd in effect that a crime committed 
ill a place over whidl the United States had exclusive 
jllrisuictioll was punishable in the same way and to the saml' 
extent as it was punishable under the law of the state, ter-
ritor~- or district within the territorial limits of which it was 
committed, and that 'every such State, Territorial, or District 
law shall, for the purposes of this section, continue in force, 
notwithstanding any subsequent repeal or amendment thereof 
by any such Statp. Territory, or District.' 
"I n construing saio section of the act, the United States 
Supreme Court has helo that the reference therein was to the 
Jaw of the state, territory. or district only as such law existed 
at thl' time of thp passagl' of the act (United States v. Press 
f'ublishil1g Co. [1910], 219 U.S. 1, 9-10 f31 S.Ct. 212, 55 
L.Ed. 65]), that said seetio!1 was designeo and served to en-
force feopral law and not the law of a state, territory, or 
di~tri('t (Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. rI937], 302 U.S. 253, 266 
[:;8 S.Ct. ]67, 82 L.Ed. 235]), and that, inasmuch as the fed-
pral law would not be responsive to changes in the law of the 
state. tl'rritory. or district, whether they should occur by way 
of repeal or amendment; said section could not properly be 
t 1"l'JIled to constitute an unlawful attempt to delegate to 
IMar lawmakers the power to work a change in the federal 
law (Franklin v. United States [1909], 216 U.S. 559, 568-569 
I:W S.Ct. 434, 54 L.Ed. 615]). 
[6] "IJikewisl', it may be said that the California Alien Land 
A('1 refers to treaties with the nations concerned only as 
s1l<·h treaties existed at the time of the passage of thp act (or 
of the aJllPndments contaiuing the same reference), that said 
:10'\ declares the law of the state and not the proyisions of 
the treaty a~reements between the United States and said na-
tions, and that, being unaffected [insofar as it may remain 
\'alid as a law of the state] by the abrogation or amendment 
of a tr('aty, sai d act does not unconstitutionally delegate to 
VI(> treatY-llIaking' authority of the United States the power to 
terlllinate or change the law of our state. 
''It should be noted that the section mentioned was sub-
) 
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stantially amended in 1943 [Stats. 1943, chs. 1003, ]0591. 
However. it was not such an amendment as would afl'ect our 
discnssion of the question here presenteo. 
"Of course if there were an express provision in the Alien 
Land Act which unmistakably made the duration of the local 
provisions coterminous with those of the treaty. such a pro- I 
vision would have to be given effeet aecording to its tenor 
and validity. An example of that kind of a provision is found 
in section 71 of title 8 of the United States Code [24 Stats. 
4761. dealing with the subject of alien ownership of land. 
The language of that section is: 
" • The prohibition of this section shall not apply to cases 
in which the right to hold or dispose of lands in the United 
States is secured by existing treaties to citizens or subjects 
of foreign countries, which rights, so far as they may exist 
by force of any such treaty, shall continue to exist so long as 
such treaties are in force, and no longer.' 
.. The fact that similar language was not used by our Legis-
lature may be thought to constitute some evidence of the fact 
that such a result was not intended. 
[7] ., Neither is this a case of temporary or emergency legis-
lation the operative effect of which, by reason of changed con-
ditions, mnst be deemed to have terminated of its own limita-
tions or which should be declared obsolete because to enforce 
it would be inequitable. (Sec for example Nashville etc. R. 00. 
v. Walters [1934], 294 U.S. 405, 415 [55 S.Ct. 486. 79 L.Ed. 
949J; O. K. Ohastleton Oorp. v. Sinclair [1923],264 U.S. 543. 
547-548 [44 S.Ct. 405,68 L.Ed. 841].) [8] The treaty of April 
5, 1911, was not of a temporary character, particularly at the 
time it was readopted in sections 2 and 3 of the Alien Land 
Act by the amendment of 1923. The duration provisions of 
the treaty were contained in article XVII, whicb read as 
follows: 
" 'The present Treaty shall enter into operation on the 17th 
of July, 1911, and shall remain in force twelve years or until 
the expiration of six months from the date on which either 
of the Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other 
of its intention to terminate the Treaty. 
"'In case neither of the Contracting Parties shall have 
given notice to the other six months before the expiration of 
the said period of twelve years. of its intention to terminate 
the Treaty, it shall continuE:' operative until the expiration 
of six months from the date on which either Party shall have 
given such notice.' 
) 
) 
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.. It is apparent that Ill!' t "('aty C'onsidpred as nl\lll i(·jpal 
law mllst be det'!n('d to have hpPIl pPJ'Jllanent or pcrrwll1al. 
(25 R.C.L. §§ 10 anfl 11, p. 76:i. BpI', Hlso. 50 Am .• Jur. 
§§ 513-515, pp. G24, 325.) 
"Nor is there anything in the sit.uation here which would 
deprive the respondent of any constitutional right if the law 
as it originally read were deemed to haye becn contilllled in 
effect subsequent to January 26, 1940 l tbe date of the treaty 
abrugation]. And in the absence of a constitutional objl'ction 
it is generally held that the courts have no right to declare 
a statute obsolete by reason of a supervening change in the 
conditions under whicb it was enacted. (Benson v. Hunter 
[1921], 23 Ariz. 132 [202 P. 233, 234J; McKeown v. State 
[1939], 197 Ark. 454 [124 S.W.2d 19, 22-23] ; Corn Exchange 
Sav. Bk. v. Smith [1931], 59 S.D. 182 [239 N.W. 186, 189, 
78 A.L.R. 800J; Gulf Refining Co. v. Oity of Dallas (Tex. 
Civ.App. [1928]), 10 S.W.2d 151, 159. See, also, Painless 
Parker v. Board of Dental Exam. [19321, 216 Cal. 285, 299 
[14 P.2d 67J.) 
[9] "Finally, the fact that, when amending the Alien 
Land Act in 1943 and again in 1945, the Legislature was 
silent on the question of tbe effect of tbe abrogation of the 
treaty on corresponding provisions of the statute, seems to 
indicate in the opinion of that body that no change was 
effected. This is particularly true in view of the fact that tbis 
act is a definite exercise of the police power expressed by tbe 
people and the Legislature of this state [ ] [Mott v. Cline 
(1927), 200 Cal. 434, 446-447 [253 P. 718]]. However re-
luctantly such power may have been exercised in favor of 
lloneligible aliens, once it was exercised its intended scope and 
effect within the defined limits were given liberal interpreta-
tion by our courts. (See State of Oalifornia v. Tagami 
[(1925), 195 Cal. 522 (234 P. 102)] at pages 529-532.) This 
accords also with the [ ] view expressed in the decisions 
that particularly in respect of matters within the police power 
the action of the state is ordinarily independent of that of 
the federal government. (People v. Pagni, supra, at page 99 
[of 69 Cal.App.J ; People v. Wood, supra, at page 625 [of 88 
Cal.App.] .) 
"Since we bave concluded that the abrogation of the treaty 
haa no effect on the provisions of the Alien Land Act, it is 
obvious that the lease of September 13, 1940, was valid irre· 
spective of such abrogation. It is unnecessary, therefore, to 
, 
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or anJllll11Jf'llt of thosr 1'1"()\"isioll~ wonkl 1111\'(' hnd, nor th!" 
cxtl'llt to ",hidl a pri\'alp illdivi(llIal as distinguished from 
the state would }Ja\"e hHd tl)(· right 10 tak(' atlnmtagt' of snch 
repeal or annulmcnt, or qurstions l'ollct'rning estoppel 011 tht' 
part of this respondent to attack the validity of the lease. 
[10] "We may notice. howcver, 011(' oth('1' rpClS()ll assignect by 
respondent for holding the lease invalid, viz., th(' fact that 
said lease contains an option provision permitting the lessee 
to purchase the property demised. [ ] [Even if we as-
sume that] this provision is void insofar as it purports to 
confer any such right on a noneligible alien, it is clearly a 
severable part of tht' lease ana its yalidity could not affect 
the remaining and valid portions thereof. (ill ott v. Cline 
[supra], 200 Cal. 434, 450 [253 P. 718]; [see, also, Spaulding 
v. Yovino-¥ounn (1947), 30 Ca1.2d 138, 141 (180 P.2d 
691)].)" 
[11] Plaintiff-lessor has particularly urged before this 
court that to construe the statute's reference to the treaty 
as being specific rather than general renders the act 
unconstitutional because with such a construction the act 
infringes upon and embarrasses the treaty-making power of 
the United States government, for the reason that Japan 
would not enter into a llt'W treaty which gives it "lesser rights 
than thos«:> now given by the frozen state laws." Subsequent 
to our granting a hearing in this case, the Suprem«:> Court 
of the United States, in Clark v. Allen (1947), 331 U.S. 503 
[67 S.Ct. 1431,91 L.Ed. 1633, 1638,170 A.L.R. 953], rejected 
a similar cont«:>ntion with reference to section 259 of the 
California Probate Code. It was there held that although 
under the provisions of the state law the right of a nonresident 
alien to take property in California by will or succession de-
pends upon a reciprocal right of United States residents and 
citizens to take property ill such alien's country, and although 
the existence of such a reciprocal right depends in part at 
least upon treaties between the government of the United 
States and that of the particular foreign country involved, the 
California statut.e is "not unconstitutional as an el.tension 
of state power into a field of foreign affairs exclusively re-
served to the federal government, and that California had 
not entered into the forbidden domain of negotiating with 
a foreign country or of making a compact with it contrary 
to article I, section 10, of the federal COllstitution." (l<:sfalt 
uf Knutzen (1948), 31 Ca1.2d 573, 577 l191 1'.2d 747 J ; 
) 
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1191 1'.211 7!l2J.) Wt· hold tilt' sarllt· 10 he 1 flU' of the Cali· 
forllia Alien Land Ad as eOl1strll('d hl'l'einabove; hener we 
need not consider other as<.;erted weaknesses in plaintiff's 
argument on this phase of the case. 
[12] It has been suggested that this case could bt' used as 
a vehicle for reexamining the earli{'r rulings of the United 
States Supreme Court and of this court holding constitutional 
the basic provisions of the Alien Land Act (see e.g., We/)u v. 
O'Brien (1923), 263 U.S. 313, 322 [44 S.Ct. 1l2, 68 L.Ed. 
318, 321J; Porterfield v. Webb (1923),263 U.S. 225,233 [44 
S.Ct. 21, 68 L.Ed. 278, 281] ; Mott v. Cline l1927), 200 Cal. 
434,445 [253 P. 718J ; In re Y. Akado (1922), 188 Cal. 739, 
743 [207 P. 245]; Frick v. Webb (1923),263 U.S. 326, 333 
144 8.0t. 115, 68 L.Ed. 323, 325-326] ; Cockrill v. California 
(1924),268 U.S. 258 [45 S.Ct. 490, 69 L.Ed. 944, 946-947]; 
see also People v. Oyama (1946), 29 OaL2d 164 [173 P.2d 
794 J and cases there cited; Oyama v. California (1948), 332 
U.S. 633 [68 8.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. --); Terrace v. 
Thompson (1923), 263 U.S. 197 [44 8.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255, 
272); United States v. Fo:r (1876), 94 U.S. 315 [24 L.Ed. 
192]), that we should reverse our previous holdings and 
dispose of this case by ruling that" the statute here involved 
is clearly unconstitutional, and should, therefore, be stricken 
down. " Weare of the view that this issue, lmnecessary to 
the decision, should not be decided here or made the subject 
of a dictum. It has heretofore been considered against the 
policy of this court (and of courts of last resort generally) 
to reach out and unnecessarily pronounce upon the constitu-
tionality of any duly enacted statute. At least as early as 
Estate of Johnson (1903), 139 Cal. 532, 534 [73 P. 424, 96 Am. 
St.Rep. 161], this court said, ,. A court will not decide a con- . 
stitutional question unless such construction is absolutely nec-
essary" (see, also, Marin Municipal Water Dist. v. Dolge 
(1916),172 Cal. 724, 726 [158 P.187]) and as recently as Hurd 
v. Hodge (May 3, 1948), 334 U.S. 24 [68 8.0t. 847, 92 L.Ed. 
-], the United States Supreme Court in determining one of 
the racial restriction casrs said: "Upon full consideration, 
however, we have found it unnecessary to resolve the constitu-
tion.al issue which petitioners advanc~; for we have concluded 
that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants bv the 
courts of the District of Columbia is improper for' other 
:az C.2d-3 
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r"nsolls hPTl'illllftl'T ~;tat('d.'''' 'fh(' footl101(' rl'fl'rred to rpads: 
"It is a well-established prineipl(' that 1his Court will not 
deeicie cOllstitutional questions where other grounds are avail· 
able and dispositive of the issues of the case. Recent expres· 
sions of that policy are to be found in Alma Motor Co. v. 
Timken-Detroit Axle Co. [1946], 329 U.S. 129 [67 L.Ed. 231, 
9] L.Ed. 128] ; Rescue Army v. Mlt1l1'(!il)ol COllrt [1947], 331 
U.S. 549 [67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666]." 
This case fits squarely into the policy above stated; we deem 
it improper to now strike that policy dowl1. It seems to us 
that good judicial practice, as well as legal precedent, requires 
that we dispose of the case on the now thoroughly established 
grounds which are set forth hereinabove rather than to gratu-
itously make opportunity for either reaching or declaring 
views on the suggested constitutional question. 
For the reasons above stated, the judgment is reversed.. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
GIBSON, C. J .-1 concur in the judgment of reversal and 
am in accord with the conclusion reached in the majority opin-
ion that the Alien Land Act incorporated the provisions of 
the treaty between the United States and Japan as it existed 
on April 5, 1911, and that the abrogation of the treaty in 1940 
had no effect on the operation of the act, which, therefore, still 
permits a lease of real property by a corporation such as the 
one involved here. 1 also agree that as a general rule we 
should not decide constitutional questions if the case can be 
disposed of on other grounds, but under the circumstances 
presented here and because of the position which I took in 
Takahashi v. Fish d'; Game Commission, 30 Cal.2d 719, 737 
[185 P.2d 805], 1 deem it proper to state that I am in full 
agreement with the additional ground for reversal set forth 
in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Carter and Mr. Jus-
tice Traynor. 
CARTER, J., and TRAYNOR, J.-We concur in the judg-
ment. 
As we view the present case it presents substantially the 
same issues of constitutionality as were involved in Taka-
hashi v. Fish &; Game Commission,30 Ca1.2d 719 [185 P.2d 
805], reversed 333 U.S. 853 [68 8. Ct. 731, 92 L.Ed -]. In 
our opinion the unconst.itntionality of the provisions of the 
California Alien Lund Act involved in this case is d('arly 
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dCIIIOllst rntf'd hy tllC disscnting opinion of Mr. ,J IIstil'C ('art rr 
in t Jlat cmiC. 1ft hese constitutional questions hall lIot pr('-
viousl.\· b:'CII eOllsidered by this \!ourt it. might bc possihll' 
to cons1rue thrsl' provisions in such a way as to avoid COI1-
stitutional implications. In view of previolls decisions of this 
court, however, such constitutional implications cannot bt' 
avoided. We wish to make it clear, therefore, that we still 
adht're to the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in 
thc Takahashi case. 
There can be no doubt that a state cannot deny "to lawful 
inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary 
means of earning a livelihood." (Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 
33, 39 [36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131, Ann.Cas. 1917B 283, L.R.A. 
1916D 545].) Thus persons may not be barred because of 
theil' race or nationalit.y from employment in the ordinary 
industry or business of another. It is common knowledge that 
it is necessary to the conduct of an ordinary industry or busi-
ness enterprise to own or lease the property in which the in-
dustry or business is conducted. If the state could prohibit 
Illirns ineligible to citizenship from owning or leasing real 
property it would thert'by e1it'ctively prevent such persons 
from conducting ordinary industrial or business enterprises. 
Such a discrimination, if valid, would confine the aliell's right 
to engage in an ordinary means of earning a livelihood til serv-
ing as an employee or servant of a citizen or of a foreign na-
tional permitted to own or lease real property or of corpora-
tions owned by a majority of such citizens or nationals. The 
rtreet of such legislation is to impose upon the alien ineligible 
to citizenship an economic status inferior to all others earning 
a li\"ing in the state. Such a discrimination cannot be sus-
tained under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States. Even in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 
lOi, 221 [44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255], the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that a state could not discriminate 
Ilg-aiust aliens ineligible to citizenship if that" discrimination 
was imposed upon the conduct of ordinary private enterprise 
cO\'ering the entire field of industry with the exception of en-
terprises that were relatively very small." 
. In our view the statute here involved is clearly unconstitu-
!:Ional. and should, tllerefore, be stricken down. 
Hespondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 8, 
1948. 
